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Would a New Zealand court decide the 
case the same way? There is no doubt the 
decision must be highly persuasive, but modi-
fication of Lange from the subject matter of 
political discussion to encompass discussion 
of matters of public interest generally is required. 
There are strong arguments that allegations 
of possible police corruption and an investi-
gation into the same should be protected 
from a defamation action. Difficulty might 
arise with the naming of the police officer, 
but the arguments in favour of naming in the 
circumstances of Flood are credible. Second, 
qualified privilege can be defeated in New 
Zealand by the statutory malice provisions 
of s19 Defamation Act 1992 namely moti-
vation by ill will or misuse of the occasion. 
The Lange court, also thought that s 19 
could encompass the taking of reasonable 
care (at [42]). Once again, it seems likely 
that our courts would follow the English 
courts in deciding that reasonable care had 
been taken and that there was no improper 
motive or misuse of the occasion in publish-
ing the material. 
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A party to a contract may cancel it under the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 if it can show 
that is has been induced into it by a misrepre-
sentation (s 7(3)(a)). It must also show that 
the misrepresentation substantially reduced 
the benefit of the contract, or substantially 
increased their burden under the contract (s 
7( 4)(b )(i) and (ii)). 
What is not clear from the statute is how 
directly related to the contract the increase in 
burden or reduction in benefit must be. In Jolly 
v Palmer [1985] 1 NZLR 658 (HC), the 
government valuation of a property was mis-
represented to the defendant purchasers. The 
defendants ar~ed that this misrepresenta-
tion substantially increased their burden under 
the contract (s 7( 4 )(b)(ii)) because the amount 
that they could raise by way of mortgage 
over the property was much lower than they 
had expected. However, Hardie Boys J held 
that as "[t]he contract did not commit them 
to undertaking any mortgage at all" then 
any increased burden in relation to the mort-
gage "was incidental or collateral to the 
contract, but not under it" (at 662). Thus, 
although the burden on the purchasers was 
substantially increased (they could no longer 
raise enough money to buy the property), 
there was no requirement under the contract 
to obtain a mortgage. Following Jolly v Palmer 
any increased burdens flowing from the con-
tract, but not contained within the contract 
itself, do not qualify under s 7(4)(b)(ii). This 
interpretation has not been universally accepted; 
Gault on Commercial Law argues that: "the 
wording of the [ statutory] paragraph appears 
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to permit the wider interpretation that any 
reduction in benefit or increase in burden 
will suffice so long as it results directly or 
indirectly from the contract" (CR 7.04(2)). 
A recent Court of Appeal decision appears 
to favour widening the interpretation of s 
7(4)(b). Kipling v Van Kan [2012] NZCA 
163 was an appeal against a High Court 
summary judgment. The appellants were three 
guarantors of a company (Brave Design Ltd) 
which owed money to the respondents under 
a lease. The High Court rejected the guaran-
tors" claim that they had an arguable defence 
to the summary judgment (HC Auckland 
CIV-2010-404-6799,23 February 2011). In 
particular, it held that a misrepresentation 
made by the respondent lessors relating to 
the use of a right-of-way did not allow the 
company to cancel the lease. 
The right:-of-way served the property next-
door and from it one could also access the 
leased property. The respondents held a right 
to use it and from the beginning of its tenancy 
Brave Design accessed the leasehold property 
via this right-of-way. It was then able to use its 
own driveway for additional parking space 
and other activities. However, the respon-
dents subsequently surrendered the right-of-
way easement. Without knowledge of this 
development, Brave Design entered into a writ-
ten lease with the respondents (the previous 
arrangement had been an informal one) and 
continued to use the next-door right-of-way 
despite having no right to do so. This was 
finally stopped when the owners of the next-
door property erected a security fence. Brave 
Design tried to reach some negotiated resolu-
tion and when none could be reached, it can-
celled the lease. The guarantors argued that 
Brave Design had been induced to enter into 
the written lease by a representation made by 
the respondents thatthe1eased property would 
still be accessible through the right-of-way. 
The High Court held that even if there had 
been a misrepresentation as to the right-of-
way, could not have met the requirements 
unders 7(4)(b) because "Brave Design always 
had alternative access to its property from the 
road frontage . .. [and] did not require the 
access from [next-door] to access its premises 
under the lease" (at [32]). 
On appea~ the Court of Appeal disagreed 
and held that if the misrepresentation could 
be established by the guarantors then it "could 
well have substantially reduced the benefit of 
the contract or have made the benefits substan-
tially different from that represented " (at [41]). 
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
with any implicit suggestion that merely 
because the next-door right-of-way was not 
referred to in the lease its loss could not sub-
stantially reduce the benefit of the contract. 
Instead it held that since the claim was that the 
lease was represented to give Brave Design 
more benefits than those actually in the lease, 
s 7(4)(b) should not be limited to benefits 
specified in the terms ofthelease (at [42]). The 
Court of Appeal has highlighted the concep-
tual difficulty with the wording of s 7 ( 4) (b ) (i) 
and (ii) - how can a misrepresentation increase 
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the burden or decrease the benefit of a con-
tract? Is it not true that only failing to fulfil 
contractual terms can do that? This concep-
tual difficulty was noted soon after the CRA 
becarnelaw(DawsonandMcLauchlan The Con-
tractual Remedies Act 1979 (Sweet & Max-
well (NZ), Auckland, 1981) at 54-55). 
The difficulty is sidestepped if one takes a 
broader view of misrepresentations that 
reduce the benefit under the contract for the 
purpose of s 7(4)(b)(i). Kipling suggests that 
these misrepresentations do not need to reduce 
benefits that the cancelling party has received 
under the terms of the contract only. Inciden-
tal or consequential benefits that flow from 
the misrepresentation, but are not actually 
benefits under the contract, are also covered. 
By the same reasoning, misrepresentations 
that increase the burden on the cancelling 
party (such as making it impossible to obtain 
a mortgage?), should also qualify for s 7(4)(b) 
even if those burdens are not terms of the 
contract. While this decision was only an 
appeal from a summary judgment applica-
tion it will be interesting to see whether 
future courts will follow the Court of Appeal's 
lead when full argument has been heard. 
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Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus 
Laboratories Inc 
566 US_ (2012) 
The United States Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed a decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the specialist 
US patent court), and held that biotechnology 
patents held by Prometheus were invalid. The 
decision has broad implications for patent-
able subject matter across a range of indus-
tries, including biotech and software patents. 
The decision was about patents involving 
the use ofthiopurine drugs in treating autoim-
mune diseases such as Crohn's disease and 
ulcerative colitis. In simple terms, the patents 
were for methods of medical diagnosis involv-
ing giving patients particular doses of the drug 
and then taking blood tests to measure the 
results in order to decide whether the patient 
had the right dose. Prometheus sold diagnos-
tic kits embodying the patented processes. 
Mayo bought and used these tests for a time, 
then began using and selling its own tests, and 
Prometheus sued for patent infringement. 
The Federal Circuit held that the patents 
were valid and infringed. The Supreme Court 
granted vacated the Federal Circuit judg-
ment, remanding it to the Federal Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's 
then recent decision in Bilski v Kappos 130 S 
Ct 3218 (2010). The Federal Circuit reaf-
firmed its earlier decision, and the Supreme 
Court on appeal reversed the Federal Cir-
cuit. The Supreme Court can therefore be 
taken as sending a clear message to the Fed-
eral Circuit on the issue of patentable subject 
matter. 
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The decision is centred on s 101 of the US 
PatentAct(35U.S.G§101) which defines pat-
entable subject matter. The Supreme Court 
has long held that § 101 contains an implicit 
exception to patentability for "[L]aws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas". The application of laws of nature to a 
new and useful end are patentable. The pa tent 
claims at issue purported to apply natural 
laws describing the relationships between the 
concentration in the blood of certain 
thiopurinemetabolites and the likelihood that 
the drug dosage would be ineffective or induce 
harmful side-effects. The issue was whether 
the claims added enough to the describednatu-
ral correlations to be patentable applications 
of natural laws. The Supreme Court held 
unanimously that they were unpatentable 
natural laws: 
the steps in the claimed processes (a part 
from the natural laws themselves) involve 
well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity previously engaged in by research-
ers in the field. At the same time, uphold-
ing the patents would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the 
underlying natural laws, inhibiting their 
use in the making of further discoveries. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
there is still a clear threshold requirement that 
subject matter of a patent must be inherently 
patentable. It has also made it clear that the 
concerns about eligible subj ect matter in Bilski 
were not confined to software patents. The 
case attracted major interest from medical 
and research organisations, many of whom 
filed briefs to the Court. The case will be wel-
comed by doctors and medical researchers 
concerned about the growing impact of patent 
protection on their work. It will also be inter-
esting to see what impact the decision will 
have on the case of Assn For Molecular Pathol-
ogy v Myriad Genetics 94 USPQ (2d) 1683 
(2010) a case aboutthe patentability of claims 
for isolating DNA for BRCAl and BRCA2 
human genes implicated in breast and ovarian 
cancer, and methods of detecting mutations. 
The Federal Circuit had found that this was 
patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court 
has vacated the Federal Circuit judgment, and 
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for 
further consideration in light of Mayo. 
In New Zealand, unlike the United States, 
caselawhasestablishedthatmethodsofmedi-
cal treatment are not patentable, and the Pat-
ents Bill now before Parliament will make this 
exclusion express in the legislation. This means 
that claims for methods of medical treatment 
will continue to be unpatentable under New 
Zealand law. However, this decision of the US 
Supreme Court decision has broader implica-
tions in terms of patentable subject matter, 
across a range of industries. The Supreme 
Court made clear that laws of nature are not 
patentable, and expressed a wider policy con-
cern about the danger of granting patents for 
basic tools of science and technology and 
thereby inhibiting innovation. These con-
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cerns are shared by many in New Zealand 
scientific communities, and are likely to be 
influential in New Zealand courts. 
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd 
[2012] HCA 16 
Copyright owners argued that an internet ser-
vice provider, iiNet, had authorised copyright 
infringement by its customers. Roadshow 
claimed that some customers of iiNet had 
infringed copyright in its films by making them 
available online using the BitTorrent peer-to-
peer file sharing system, and that iiNet had 
infringed copyright by authorising its custom-
ers' infringing acts. The Australian Federa-
tion Against Copyright Theft (AFACT) had 
provided to iiNet notices of specific infringe-
ments by its customers, and it was alleged that 
iiNet didnottake reasonable steps in response 
to these notices. 
Authorisation is a basis of copyright 
infringement in both Australia and New 
Zealand, but the Australian statutory frame-
work for authorisation is different from that 
in New Zealand. The Australian statute pro-
vides for specific matters to be taken into 
account in determining infringement, the New 
Zealand Act offers no guidance. The Copy-
right Act 1968 (Cth),s 101(lA) provides that: 
In determining, for the purposes of sub sec-
tion (1), whether or not a person has 
authorised the doing in Australia of any 
act comprised in a copyright subsisting by 
virtue of this Part without the licence of 
the owner of the copyright, the matters 
that must be taken into account include 
the following: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person's 
power to prevent the doing of the 
act concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship exist-
ing between the person and the per-
son who did the act concerned; 
(c) whether the person took any other 
reasonable steps to prevent or avoid 
the doing of the act, including 
whether the person complied with 
any relevant industry codes of 
practice. 
In both Australia and New Zealand, internet 
service providers are notliable for the infringe-
ments by their customers simply because they 
provide the service of connection to the 
internet. Beyond that, the frameworks are 
somewhat different. Nevertheless, this deci-
sion is of interest in New Zealand because of 
its interpretation of the meaning of author is a-
tion, although it should be borne in mind that 
to s 101(1) of the Australian Act there is no 
New Zealand equivalent. 
On the facts, the H CA upheld the decision 
of the Full Federal Court that iiNet had not 
authorised infringement. French CJ, Cren-
nan and Keifel 11 said that authorisation 
depends on all the facts of the case. An alleged 
authoriser must have a power to prevent the 
primary infringement, and the extent of iiNet's 
power was limited to an indirect power to 
prevent a customer's primary infringement of 
the appellants' films by terminating the con-
tractual relationship between them. The infor-
mation contained in the AFACT notices did 
not provide iiNet with a reasonable basis for 
sending warning notices to individual custom-
ers containing threats to suspend or terminate 
those customers' accounts, so that iiNet's inac-
tivity after receipt of the AFACT notices did 
not give rise to an inference of authorisation. 
The Judges said that this finding showed that 
the concept and the principles of authorisa-
tion were not readily suited to enforcing copy-
right against widespread infringements 
occasioned by peer-to-peer file sharing, not-
ing that other jurisdictions had introduced 
specially targeted legislative schemes ( as New 
Zealand has recently done in enacting the 
Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amend-
mentAct2011). 
Gummow and Hayne 11 agreed that the 
appeal should be dismissed, but issued sepa-
rate reasons. They also applied the factors in s 
101(lA). the Judges said that the power of 
iiNet was limited by the nature of its commer-
cial relationship with its subscribers, and that 
iiNet could not control the choice of its sub-
scribers and other users to utilise the BitTor-
rent software, nor could iiNet modify the 
BitTorrent software or take down the appel-
lants' films which were made available online. 
In relation to what constituted reasonable 
steps, the Judges said that the only indisput-
ably practical course of action would be an 
exercise of contractual power to switch off 
and terminate further activity on suspect 
accounts, but that this would not merely avoid 
further infringement but it would deny to the 
iiNet customers non-infringing uses of the 
iiNet facilities. In any event, cancelled iiNet 
subscribers would be free to take their busi-
ness to another ISP. The Judges said that it was 
not unreasonable for iiNet to take the view 
that it need not act upon the incomplete allega--
tions of primary infringements in the AF ACT 
Notices without further investigation which 
it should not be required itself to undertake. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
This is an important case for internet ser-
vice providers, and might be expected to be 
the last word on internet service provider liabil-
ity in Australia. However, this is unlikely to be 
the case. The Hollywood interests that brought 
the action will continue to raise these issues 
with internet service providers, and to lobby 
for a specific legislative regime, especially in 
light of comments of some of the Judges about 
targeted legislative schemes. Many content 
provides want a system of warning notices 
and disconnection of customers similar to that 
in New Zealand, and iiNet's success in the 
High Court will be seen as demonstrating a 
need for such a system. ISPs, on the other 
hand, argue that it is time of content providers 
to make more of their material-legitimately 
available to their customers. 0 
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